Following the recent Somerset Council meeting where a motion was passed to ‘seek grounds to evict Elbit (UK) or dispose of the premises and the subsequent apology from Somerset that ‘Elbit (UK) ‘ didn’t supply weapons to the Israeli Military’, the Campaign Against the Arms Trade has provided its research into Elbit so that people can understand what the actual situation is. A CAAT spokesperson said “Elbit in Bristol have had some export licences for export to Israel, disclosed through FOI requests. From subsequent FOI requests, which have received only partial answers, we know that there have not been any further export licence applications by Elbit Systems in Bristol for export to Israel, in the following categories:1)For export directly to the Israeli government or military. 2) For export to any company in Israel except Elbit Systems or Israeli Aerospace Industries (which of course may then be incorporated into equipment for use by the Israeli military). They refused to confirm or deny if they held any information specifically about export licences where the initial end user in Israel was Elbit or IAI, for all of Elbit’s subsidiaries. This would cover export licence applications up to June 2023, the most recent published data available.”
Cllr Brian Smedley (Labour Bridgwater South) who moved the motion said “From this evidence there’s no doubt that the weapons company Elbit supplies the Israeli army and government and that Elbit(UK) are a subsidiary of that parent company and also has its own subsidiaries. There are clearly the 2 export licences identified above which suggest that Elbit(UK) is at least an ‘occaisional exporter to Israel’ and so we welcome Elbit(UK)’s engagement with Somerset officers to confirm what exactly they do from their premises in Bristol. Are there ongoing export licences for Elbit in Bristol to export to Israel, where the initial recipient was Elbit or IAI or were they just historic ‘ one offs’? Either way the County Property & Investments panel is meeting this week and we trust they will be looking at all this evidence, plus what they’ve discovered at Elbit in Aztec West and come to a judgement in line with Council policy.”
About Elbit Systems
1. Elbit Systems (“Elbit”) is “an international high technology company engaged in a wide range of programs throughout the world, primarily in the defense and homeland security arenas.”[1]
2. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)’s list of the “Top 100 arms producing and military services companies” worldwide for 2020,[2] it is Israel’s largest arms company, with2020 total revenues of $4,663 million, of which military-related sales constituted $4,240 million (or 91%). At the end of 2020, it had 16,676 employees worldwide.[3]
It is headquartered in Haifa, Israel.
3. According to its website, its major areas of activity are:[4] military aircraft and helicopter systems; commercial aviation systems and aerostructures; unmanned aircraft systems and unmanned surface vessels; electro-optic, night vision and and countermeasures systems;
land vehicle systems; munitions; command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and cyber systems; electronic warfare and signal intelligence systems; and other commercial activities.
4. While based in Israel, Elbit is a global company, with subsidiaries in the USA, the UK, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Romania, and South Korea.[5]
5. According to the Database of Israeli Military and Security Exports (DIMSE) produced by the American Friends Service Committee (a US-based Quaker-organisation),[6] “Elbit provides up to 85% of the land- based equipment procured by the Israeli military and about 85% of its drones, but it is also a company with international reach – 80% of its market is outside Israel. It has military contracts with governments in the US, UK and Europe, Africa, Asia and South America. It manufactures most of its equipment in Israel, the US, Europe and Brazil.”
6. Elbit’s drones, including the Skylark surveillance drone and the Hermes 900 armed drone, have frequently been used in various Israeli military assaults on Gaza. The company has been one of the main providers of the electronic detection fence system to the separation/Apartheid Wall in the occupied West Bank. The company regularly markets its equipment worldwide as “battle-tested”, based on its use in the West Bank and Gaza.[7]
7. Elbit has exported, and continues to export, its equipment to numerous countries involved in conflict and/or with highly repressive regimes. These include Azerbaijan, Colombia, Ethiopia, India, the Philippines, Thailand, and Uganda.[8]
Elbit Systems UK
8. Elbit Systems UK Ltd. (“Elbit UK”) is the UK subsidiary of Elbit Systems.
9. Elbit UK has become a significant supplier to the UK Ministry of Defence, including being one of the two main companies involved in the MOD’s Watchkeeper UAV programme, along with Thales UK.[9]
10. The Watchkeeper is “a dual sensor and all-weather unmanned aircraft system (UAS) that provides real time aerial reconnaissance to enable increased situational awareness for ground-based forces.” [10]
11. The MOD ordered Watchkeeper in 2005, with the drones delivered between 2012-2016, for a cost of £700m.[11]Thales UK were the prime contractor, with the design of the Watchkeeper to be based on Elbit’s Hermes-450 UAV..
12. Partly in connection with this, Elbit has established or bought up several subsidiaries and joint ventures in the UK, under the umbrella of “Elbit Systems UK” (“Elbit UK”). These include UAV Engines Ltd. (“UAV Engines”), UAV Tactical Systems Ltd. (“UAV Tactical Systems” or “U-Tacs”), Ferranti Technologies (“Ferranti”) and Instro Precision Ltd (“Instro Precision”).[12]
13. In total, Elbit has thirteen sites in the UK, and over 600 employees.[13]
14. These subsidiary companies produce equipment that may be supplied to the UK MOD, as well as to export customers.
15. All of the subsidiaries listed above have applied for export licenses for military equipment to Israel. About Elbit Systems in Bristol
16. Elbit Systems UK has two sites in Bristol. One is the company’s registered headquarters, at 2 Temple Back East, Temple Quay.[14] The other is a manufacturing site at 600 Aztec West, the site of the protest in May 2022.
17. It is not clear from publicly available materials exactly which subsidiary or business unit of Elbit Systems UK the Bristol site is part of. According to the statement by Martin Kelly of 29 th June 2022, “The site is a systems design and software development facility where our engineers work on solutions to deliver synthetic training, sophisticated battlefield management applications and defensive maritime capabilities…”. In his separate statement of 3rd October 2022, Kelly describes the activities of the staff at Aztec West as “a range of multi-disciplinary activities including technology design and development, systems and software engineering, project management, IT and business support services…”. The statement of DC Paul Brown of 14th October 2022 refers to the site “supporting business in the UK and Canada”, as well as exchanging software and documentation with the parent company in Israel.
18. I have looked at the public LinkedIn profiles of Elbit Systems UK staff who specify Bristol as their work location, and who have frontline engineering/development-related roles (as opposed to e.g. administrative, financial, or IT support). These include:
◦ The Head of Commercial (C4I)[15]
◦ A Senior Software Engineer focusing on simulation
◦ The Training and Simulation Solutions Director
◦ The Head of Systems Engineering
19. This is consistent with the statements of Martin Kelly regarding the business activities of the site, focused on software, training & simulation, systems engineering, battlefield management, etc.
20. Unfortunately, Elbit Systems UK’s website rarely states which site is involved in which activities. However,one article on their news section, dated 14 March 2022, has the headline “Elbit Systems UK To Supply TORCH-X Battle Management Solution For Canada‘s Airspace Coordination Centre Modernisation Project”.[16] While the location at which this is taking place is not given, it is plausible that this is the Bristol site, consistent with Martin Kelly’s statement that the activities include battlefield management, and the information provided to PC Brown, that the site’s customers include Canada.
21. The products and services provided by the Aztec West site, therefore, are central to the pursuit of high-tech modern warfare.About the UK export licensing system
16. Exports of controlled goods from the UK, including military goods and dual use goods, are illegal unless an export licence is obtained for the export from the UK government.
17. Full guidance on the export licence system for military goods, software, and technology, can be found at:https://www.gov.uk/guidance/export-controls-military-goods-software-and-technology
18. Further information can be found in the government’s Annual Reports on Strategic Export Controls:https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/united-kingdom-strategic-export-controls-annual-report
19. A complete list of goods subject to strategic export controls (military and dual use) is available at:https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1052560/uk-strategic-export-control-lists.pdf
20. While similar rules apply to military and dual use goods, this report is only concerned with military goods.
21. All licences must specify one or more end-users of the equipment to be exported, that is the people or organisations to which the equipment will be delivered, or by which it will subsequently be used.
22. Companies making export licence applications must submit end-user undertakings provided by the end-user, confirming that they are the end-user, and agreeing not to transfer the equipment to anyone not authorised under the export licence.
23. There are three principal types of export licence:
23.a. Single Individual Export Licences (SIELs). These authorise the transfer of a fixed quantity of
specified goods (equipment, software, and/or technology) to a specified end-user, for a specified
value, during the period of validity of the licence, which is generally 2 years.
23.b. Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs). These authorise the transfer of unlimited quantities of specified goods to end-users in one or more destination countries, with no limit on value, for the period of validity of the licence, which is generally either 3 or 5 years.
23.c. Open General Export Licences (OGELs). These are pre-issued licences, covering one or more
destinations and a specified list of goods or categories of goods. Companies may register for these
OGELs, subject to certain conditions. Once registered, companies can export unlimited quantities and values of goods covered by the licence to destinations covered by it, subject to certain conditions.
24. All of the export licences referred to in this report at SIELs.
25. SIELs are divided into two types: regular SIELs, and ‘Incorporation’ SIELs.
26. Incorporation licences are licences where the equipment exported may be incorporated into a larger system or piece of equipment in the recipient country, which is then exported to one or more third countries – the ‘incorporation destinations’.
27. For example, if a UK company is selling components for UAVs (drones) to a company in Israel that makes complete drones, then they must list all the possible customers the complete drones might be sold to on the export licence application. If some of the drones are to be sold to the Israeli Army, then that must be listed, and if some of the drones are to be exported to another country, say India or the USA, then these countries must also be listed.
28. If the licence is not an incorporation licence, then it means that the licence only allows the components, or the complete drones they are included in, to be sold to recipients in Israel.
29. If the licence is an incorporation licence, for example with India as an “incorporation destination”, then it means that some of the complete drones may be sold to India. However, the licence may also authorise others of the drones to be sold to the Israeli armed forces. We are just not told whether this is the case or not, as only the potential third country destinations are publicly reported.
30. It is important to emphasise that equipment being listed under an incorporation licence does not mean it is not also used by the original destination country as well. Many of the licences issued to Elbit subsidiaries for export to Israel either are, or may be, incorporation licences. Nonetheless, in every case it is possible that the equipment exported from the UK to Israel will also be used by the Israeli armed forces, as well as any third countries authorised in the incorporation licence.
31. Export licence applications are processed by the Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU), within the Department for International Trade.
32. All licence applications are assessed against a set of criteria, detailed below. The full criteria can be found,among other places, at: https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written statements/detail/2021-12-08/hcws449.[17]
33. The eight Criteria relate to:
i) Respect for the UK’s international obligations and commitments, in particular sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council or the European Union, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations.
ii) The respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country for international humanitarian law.
iii) The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts.
iv) Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.
v) The national security of the UK and territories whose external relations are the UK’s responsibility, as well as that of friendly and allied countries.
vi) The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in
particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law.
vii) The existence of a risk that the items will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.
viii) The compatibility of the transfer with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources.
34. Following evaluation of a licence application, a licence may be approved or refused, or approved in part and refused in part. A licence application may also be withdrawn by the applicant at any time prior to a decision, or the application process may be stopped by ECJU before a decision is made, for example if the applicant fails to provide necessary additional information.
35. Licences that have been issued may subsequently be revoked in whole or in part, in the event of a change in circumstances that would lead to the export violating the Consolidated Criteria (for example the outbreak of an armed conflict involving the recipient country, the imposition of an arms embargo, evidence emerging that the exported equipment is being diverted to an unauthorised third party, etc.).
36. The UK government frequently claims to operate one of the most “rigorous and robust” export systems in the world, aimed at preventing the negative consequences of arms being transferred to those will misuse them to the detriment of human rights, the safety of civilians in conflict, and international peace and security. However, repeated evidence of the operation of the system in practice belies this claim.
37. The clearest example of this is the UK government’s continued approval of arms export licences to Saudi Arabia, the UK’s largest arms customer, [18] for use in the war in Yemen, which has led to the deaths over 230,000 people since the beginning of the Saudi intervention in 2015.[19] Analysis of the material provided by Kate Hallam
22. The material provided by Kate Hallam includes details provided by the Department for International Trade (DIT) of two Single Individual Export Licences (SIELs) applied for by the Elbit Systems UK site at Aztec West since 2018. This was in the Annex to to the DIT’s response, dated 7 October 2022, to a FOIA request by Ms. Hallam, dated 15th August 2022. This Annex is referred to as KH-06 in the witness statement of Kate Hallam.
23. Both the SIELs were issued to the company. Both were for permanent export, and were for export of goods to Israel. I shall refer to the first licence in the table as Licence 1, and the second as Licence 2.
24. I have cross-referenced the information in KH-06 with the CAAT export licence database.[20] The CAAT database is sourced entirely from the government’s own export licences database,[21] but presents the information in a far more user-friendly, interactive, and fine-grained form. While the government database only presents information on what has been licenced to a given recipient over a chosen search period with a minimum of 30 days, the CAAT database, by carrying out thousands of automated, overlapping searches, is able to narrow the information down to what is licenced to each recipient on each single day.
25. The details of each licence, including both the information in the FOIA request, and the additional information that can be found from cross-referencing with the CAAT database, are discussed below.
Licence 1
26. This licence was applied for on 10 December 2020, and issued on 25 January 2021. (KH-06)
27. The licence covered the following item descriptions: (KH-06)
a) Components for military communications equipment
b) Military communications equipment
c) Software for military communications equipment
28. The licence covered the Military List (ML) codes ML11a (“Electronic equipment specially designed or modified for military use and specially designed components therefor”) and ML21a (software specially designed for the development, production, operation or maintenance of military equipment, materials, or software). (KH-06). Items a) and b) above would fall under the category ML11a, while item c) would fall under the category ML21a.
29. The status of the licence at the time of the response (7 October 2022) is given as “Extant (licence exhausted).” (KH-06). This means that the licence was still within its 2-year period of validity (from 10 December 2020), but that the full quantity of goods covered by the licence had already been exported. The licence had thus been fully used, and could no longer be used to export further goods.
30. It is therefore uncertain whether the licence was already exhausted by the date of the protest, 15 May 2022, or whether it was still valid for export of the specified goods to Israel.
31. The CAAT database shows that just one SIEL was issued for export to Israel on 25 January 2021. The item descriptions and ML codes shown in the CAAT database match exactly those shown in KH-06. This is therefore the licence in question.
32. The licence was not for incorporation. This means that the equipment exported using the licence – or any larger systems containing the equipment – could only be supplied to a final end-user in Israel.
33. The value of goods authorised for export by the licence, by ML category, was: ML11: £8,465; ML21:£1,200.
Licence 2
34. Licence 2 was applied for on 21 July 2020, and was issued on 13 October 2020. (KH-06)
35. The licence covered the following item descriptions: (KH-06)
a) Body armour
b) Components for military communications equipment
c) Components for military electronic equipment
d) Military communications equipment
e) Military electronics equipment
f) Technology for military communications equipment
36. The licence covered the ML codes ML11a (military electronics equipment), ML13d1 (“Soft body armour or protective garments, manufactured to military standards or specifications, or to their equivalents, and specially designed components therefor”), and ML22a (Technology for military purposes). (KH-06)
37. Item a) above would fall into the category ML13d1, items b) through e) would be under ML11a, and item f) under ML22a.
38. The status of the licence is given as “Extant” (KH-06). This means that the licence was still within its period of validity at the time of the response (7 October 2022), and that the licence had not been fully used, i.e. the full quantity and value of goods authorised for export under the licence had not yet been exported. Thus, the company could continue to use the licence for further export of goods to Israel.
39. It follows that the licence was likewise extant on the date of the protest, 15 May 2022.
40. According to the CAAT database, four SIELs were issued for export to Israel on 13 October 2022. This includes three licences covering the category ML11.
41. The item descriptions covered by licences issued on this date include all those listed in 57) above, as well as three additional items: in the category ML11: Components for electronic warfare equipment, and military guidance/navigation equipment; and in the category ML10: components for military training aircraft.
42. It follows that the four SIELs issued for export to Israel on 13th October 2020 included Licence 2 here discussed, and three other licences (issued to other companies), one covering components for electronic warfare equipment, one covering military guidance/navigation equipment, and one covering components for military training aircraft.
43. None of the licences issued that day to Israel were for incorporation. Thus licence 2 was not for
incorporation, and the goods exported under licence 2, and any equipment containing them, could only be supplied to a final end-user in Israel.
44. The value of goods covered by the licence, by ML category, was: M10: £3,028; ML11: £37,366; ML13: £18; and ML22: £10.
45. It follows that Licence 2 included the full sums noted above under ML13 and ML22. However, for goods in the category ML11, it is not possible, based on the information available in the government database and processed by the CAAT database, to disaggregate the value of the ML11 goods between Licence 2 and the other two ML11 licences issued to Israel that day. We can only say that the value of ML11 goods authorised for export under Licence 2 was at most £37,366.
46. In the Appendix to this report, I show and explain the methodology used by the CAAT database, and confirm the results above, by comparing two reports generated from the government export licencing database, one covering the period 13 September 2020 – 12 October 2020, and the other covering the period 13 September 2020 – 13 October 2020. The differences between the two are therefore what was licenced on 13 October 2022.
Analysis, and comparison with the statements of Martin Kelly and DC Brown
47. The above has established that Elbit Systems UK, from their Bristol site, applied for and received two SIELs for permanent export of military goods to Israel since 2018.
48. Neither licence was an incorporation licence. The goods supplied under these licences, and any larger systems incorporating these goods, could only be supplied to final end-users in Israel.
49. At least one of these licences, Licence 2, was extant on May 15 2022, and could thus still be used for the export of military goods and equipment to Israel. (It is also possible, though not certain, that Licence 1 was still extant).
50. According to the information provided to DC Brown, in his statement of 14th October 2022, “The information I have received states that Elbit Systems UK Ltd. (“ESUK”) did not hold any Single Individual Export Licences in November 2021, Open Individual Export Licences or End User Undertakings which would allow shipment of military equipment to a military end user in Israel (Israeli MOD or Israeli Defence Forces)”.
51. This would appear to contradict the information provided by the DIT FOIA response discussed above, which in particular shows that Licence 2, issued in October 2020, was still extant at the time of the response in October 2022 (and therefore, a fortiori, in November 2021).
52. However, we do not know for certain the identity or nature of the end user of this licence. It is entirely possible that the end user was a defence company in Israel, which intended to use the equipment supplied under the licence to produce larger systems for sale to a third party customer.
53. Since the licence was not for incorporation, such a third party customer must have been in Israel (assuming that the initial end user did not break their end user undertaking). Once again, we cannot know the identity of this final end user, but it is clear that the equipment supplied under Licence 2 was of a military nature and for military purposes. It is thus most likely that this final end user was indeed an Israeli military customer. It is hard to see who else in Israel would have use for systems involving military electronics equipment and military communications equipment.
54. This does not contradict the information supplied to DC Brown, although it does suggest that DC Brown’s interlocutor was being somewhat disingenuous in their responses.
55. Martin Kelly’s statement of 3rd October 2022 states that, on the date of the protest, 15 May 2022, staff at the Aztec West site “would have been engaged” in activities “all in support of delivering defence capabilities to the UK Ministry of Defence directly or via prime contractors to the UK Ministry of Defence.”
56. We know that, on 15 May 2022, ESUK, based at this site, held at least one SIEL for export to Israel. We also know, from the information provided to DC Brown, that the company had a customer in Canada. Thus, the UK MOD (directly or via prime contractors) was not the only customer for ESUK at this site at the time.
57. Of course, it is not possible for an outsider to know exactly what contracts the staff at the site were engaged in on a specific date. From the formulation provided by DC Brown’s interlocutor (“would have been engaged”), it is not clear either that this person knew exactly which contracts were being worked on that day.
It is possible that, in fact, the only work taking place at the site that day was on projects ultimately for the UK MOD. However, this is not certain.
58. What is clear from the information in KH-06 and discussed above, is that ESUK at Aztec West, on 15 May 2022, did in fact have outstanding work for military equipment for an end user in Israel, covered by an extant export licence.
59. I therefore conclude that it is a credible allegation that, on 15 May 2022, ESUK at Aztec West were engagedin activities for the production of military equipment for export to Israel, most likely for ultimate use by the Israeli military.
Appendix
1. In this Appendix, I illustrate the sort of methodology used by the CAAT export licence database to “scrape”
information from the government database, and in doing so I confirm the results relating to Licence 2
discussed above.
2. I conducted two searches of the government database
(https://www.exportcontroldb.trade.gov.uk/sdb2/fox/sdb/), one (SPF-01) covering the period 13 September
2020 to 12 October 2020, and the other (SPF-02) covering the period 13 September 2020 to 13 October
2020.
3. It follows that the difference between the two represents what was licenced on 13 October 2020.
4. For each report, I selected Israel as the destination country. I selected only SIELs, and only those that were
issued (rather than refused or revoked). I requested case summaries in annual report format, which is the
most useful form for our purposes. It is not possible, in the government database, to select only military or
only dual use goods.
5. On p20 of SPF-01, under the heading “SIELs – Permanent and Temporary (excluding Incorporation and
Transhipment)” we see (in the table headed “issued”) that 6 licences for military goods were issued
between 13 September and 12 October 2020. On p20 of SPF-02, we see that 10 licences for military goods
were issued between 13 September and 13 October 2022. It follows that 4 licences were issued on 13
October 2022, as reported by the CAAT database.
6. Also on p20 of SPF-01, under the same heading and the table headed “military” we have a list of the number
and value of licences issued under each ML category from 13 Sep – 12 Oct. Relevant to our purposes, we see
that 2 licences were issued covering the ML10 category, to a value of £487,000. No licences were issued in
the categories ML11, ML13, or ML22.
7. In the corresponding table on p20 of SPF-02, we see that 3 ML10 licences were issued, to a value of
£490,028; 3 ML11 licences to a value of £37,366; 1 ML13 licence to a value of £18; and 1 ML22 licence to a
value of £10. The numbers and values in the other ML categories (ML1, 3, 4, and 5) are identical to those
given in SPF-01.
8. It follows that, on 13 October, 3 licences were issued covering the ML11 category, and one each covering the
categories ML10, ML13, and ML22. (In total 4 military licences were issued, implying that at least one
licence must have covered multiple ML categories). The value by category was: ML10: £490,028 – £487,000
= £3,028; ML11: £37,366 (minus £0); ML13: £18; ML22: £10. Again, this confirms the information in the
CAAT database.
9. Comparing the lists of items at the bottom of p20 in SPF-01, and at the bottom of p20 running over into the
top of p21 in SPF-02, we see that SPF-02 includes all the items listed in SPF-01, and in addition, the items
listed in 57 a) to f) above. None of these licences are marked with a “T”, which would indicate a licence for
temporary export. These were therefore the items licenced on 13 October 2022, confirming the information
in the CAAT database. None
10. Note that all of the above data relates to SIEL licences that are NOT for incorporation.
11. Turning to SIELs for incorporation, on p21 of SPF-01, under the heading “SIELs – Incorporation”, and the
table headed “issued”, we see that 3 Incorporation SIELs were issued for military goods between 13
September – 12 October 2020.
12. In the corresponding table at the bottom of p21 of SPF-02, we see that, during the period 13 September – 13
October 2022, 3 Incorporation SIELs were also issued.
13. It follows that no Incorporation SIELs were issued on 13 October 2022 for the export of military goods to
Israel. Again, this confirms the information in the CAAT database.
14. The lengths to which I have gone to establish the details of licences issued to just one country on one day,
using only the government database, hopefully illustrates the value of the CAAT database for this type of
analysis.
[1] https://elbitsystems.com/about-us-introduction/
[2] https://sipri.org/publications/2021/sipri-fact-sheets/sipri-top-100-arms-producing-and-military-services-companies-2020
[3] Elbit Systems annual report to the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for 2020, https://elbitsystems.com/media/ESLT-
12.31.2020-20-F-Doc-Full-Final-Q42020.pdf
[4] https://elbitsystems.com/about-us-introduction/
[5] See American Friends Service Committee, Database of Israeli Military & Security Exports, https://dimse.info/elbit-systems/
[6]
Ibid.
[7]
Ibid.
[8]
Ibid.
[9]E.g. https://www.army-technology.com/projects/watchkeeper/ See also SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, which records the development in
the UK of the Watchkeeper using Elbit’s designs as an arms transfer from Israel to the UK: www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
[10] https://www.army-technology.com/projects/watchkeeper/
[11] SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, https://sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
[12]See Elbit Systems UK website, https://www.elbitsystems-uk.com/, also CAAT arms companies database for locations and subsidiaries,
https://caat.org.uk/data/companies/elbit-systems/map?country=country,united-kingdom
[13]https://www.elbitsystems-uk.com/about-us/vision-mission
[14]https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/05241591
[15]C4I stands for “Computers, Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence”.
[16]https://www.elbitsystems-uk.com/media-events/recent-news/elbit-systems-uk-to-supply-torch-x-battle-management-solution-for-canada-
s-airspace-coordination-centre-modernisation-project
[17]The export licensing criteria were revised by the UK Government on 8 December 2021, although the the broad areas covered by the criteria are the same. The former criteria, which were the ones in force at the time the licences in KH-05 were issued, can be found at
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm140325/wmstext/140325m0001.htm.
[18]Precise figures on the value of UK arms exports by recipient country are not available. However, over the past 10 years, Saudi Arabia ranks first among UK arms customers both in terms of the value of Single Individual Export Licences issued – see
https://caat.org.uk/data/exports-uk/overview?date_from=2011&date_to=2020 and in terms of the volume of deliveries of major conventional weapons, as measured by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), using their non-financial “Trend
Indicator Value”, the only comprehensive and internationally comparable global measure of arms transfers available, see
https://sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
[19]UN News, 1 December 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1078972
[20]https://caat.org.uk/data/exports-uk/
[21]https://www.exportcontroldb.trade.gov.uk/sdb2/fox/sdb/SDBHOME